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Abstract 
The transport sector is consistently responsible for around 30% of carbon dioxide emissions in 
developed countries and is one of few sectors where emissions continue to increase as a result of 
apparently insatiable demand for road and air travel. This paper examines how the formulation of 
transport policy fits into the exposition of UK climate policy, focusing on three principal areas of 
tension: policy priority (congestion and carbon reduction); strategies to reduce emissions 
(technological and behavioural solutions) and timescale (short- and long-term vision). We suggest that 
in overcoming such tensions government ministers will need to devolve significant policy formulation 
and implementation powers to an appropriate scale of governance – in this case the city-region – to 
fashion a ‘convergence space’ capable of promoting meaningful action with regard to transport’s 
climate impact. 
 
Keywords: UK, transport policy, climate policy, behaviour change, scale. 
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Introduction 
The contribution of transport activities to climate change is increasingly attracting political attention 
due to their share of overall greenhouse-gas emissions and their relentlessly strong growth (Chapman 
2007). The absolute and relative share of greenhouse gases attributable to transport is expanding in all 
regions of the world as demand for surface and air travel increases and sectors such as industry and 
power generation become more energy efficient (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2005; European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) 2007). Whatever the eventual shape of international 
approaches to addressing emissions, individual nations are forging ahead with measures to meet 
domestic greenhouse-gas targets (Bailey and Rupp 2005). To an extent this is true of transport, 
although to date politicians have shown a general unwillingness to implement strong measures to 
accelerate the development and uptake of low carbon technology or to manage total travel demand 
(Anable and Boardman 2005).  
 
This paper develops an overview and critique of how the formulation and delivery of transport policy 
fits into the exposition of climate policy in the UK, one country whose government has seemingly 
sought to sidestep these difficult policy decisions (Docherty and Shaw 2003). We firstly set the 
context for carbon emissions from transport and then examine three key areas of tension in policy 
formulation and the delivery of carbon reductions. As well as revisiting familiar arguments that carbon 
reduction strategies for transport should contain a balanced range of measures and that ministers will 
need to demonstrate greater willingness to take unpopular policy decisions, we draw upon notions of 
governance scales and ‘convergence space’ (Routledge 2003) to suggest that central government will 
need to devolve significant policy formulation and implementation powers to city-regions in order to 
better address transport’s climate impact. 
 
Carbon emissions from the UK transport sector  
The share of UK transport-related emissions of CO2 depends on how emissions are apportioned across 
sectors and whether international aviation and shipping are included in the figures. The first distinction 
is between ‘end-user’ or ‘source’ figures where the former include a share of upstream emissions from 
power stations and refineries reallocated back to the sectors that use the electricity or fuel, and the 
latter do not. Total UK emissions in both cases were the same (151.7 Million tonnes Carbon (MtC) in 
2005, excluding international aviation and shipping) (Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) 2007a) but transport sector figures increase from 35.2 to 41.6MtC (23% to 27%) of 
total domestic CO2 once upstream emissions are reallocated. The second distinction is between 
domestic and international emissions (Table 1). Government targets usually exclude international 
aviation and shipping, as there is no agreed convention for allocating these emissions to countries. A 
truer picture of the UK’s emissions would include some element of these: estimations based on fuel 
used in international bunkers (one way of accounting for international departures) would add 11MtC 
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to these figures, increasing transport’s share to 28% (46.3MtC) as source or 32% (52.7MtC) as end 
user of an expanded UK carbon footprint. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Even without international aviation, transport is the only UK economic sector where emissions have 
consistently increased year on year and were higher in 2005 than the Kyoto baseline year of 1990. 
Government projections for CO2 from transport and its position relative to other sectors are dependent 
on several assumptions about changes in traffic demand, fuel prices and income growth. They are also 
crucially dependent on estimates of carbon savings allocated to individual policy instruments in its 
Climate Change Programme (CCP) (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(DETR) 2000a, DEFRA 2004, 2006a). Together, current transport policies in the CCP are set to save 
6.67MtC annually by 2010. Forecasting emissions is, however, highly problematic and the 
government has regularly revised its projections, usually because previous estimates have proven to be 
optimistic (Anable and Boardman 2005; Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) 2006): at past 
progress rates the UK is currently around 12 years behind target for average European new car fuel 
efficiency, for example (Figure 1). In addition, the CCP package has several potentially serious 
omissions. Most significantly, the package does not include the two fastest growing sources of 
emissions from transport, namely from light goods vehicles (vans) and international aviation. A recent 
review of aviation forecasts revealed that, by 2050, the sector could have 4-10 times its 1990 
emissions, resulting in aviation accounting for 27-68% of the government’s whole economy emissions 
target of 65MtC that year (Cairns and Newson 2006). 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Even if projected CO2 savings are realised for domestic transport, without new measures total 
transport emissions are unlikely to fall below 1990 levels by 2050 (Figure 2). The UK Kyoto 
commitment, excluding international aviation and shipping, is a 12.5% reduction in greenhouse gases 
from 1990 levels and the draft Climate Change Bill published in March 2007 proposes statutory 
targets to reduce CO2 by 26-32% by 2020 and 60% by 2050 (HM Government 2007). By the 
government’s own admission, it needs to achieve the upper end of savings from all its policies in the 
recent Energy White Paper, including EU Emissions Trading, to achieve the 2020 targets (Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) 2007a). 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Tensions in delivery 
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Policies to reduce energy use and emissions from transport generally fall into three categories: those 
promoting technical advances in fuel carbon coefficients and engine efficiency; those targeting modal 
switch; and those attempting to reduce distance travelled. Achieving greater sustainability in transport 
requires actions in all three areas, particularly to negate the tendency for efficiency savings to be 
eroded by increases in distances travelled or the uptake of larger, higher carbon vehicles. But current 
UK policy relies heavily on the first approach, with less emphasis placed on the other two goals. 
Furthermore, a number of these technical solutions are largely beyond the jurisdiction of the UK 
government, for example the voluntary agreements signed between the European Commission and car 
manufacturers on carbon emissions from new passenger vehicles (ECMT 2007). There also appears to 
be no long term strategy to identify the combination of strategies required to return road transport 
emissions to their 1990 level by 2050.  
 
Carbon and congestion 
In 1998, the government published A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone, which set out an 
‘integrated’ policy to tackle congestion and pollution (DETR 1998). The document appeared to reflect 
a ‘new realist’ approach of restricting car use and optimising existing infrastructure use (Goodwin et 
al. 1991) but over the next a couple of years subsequent policy documents abandoned any ambition of 
traffic reduction and instead prioritised only congestion (Begg and Gray 2004; DETR 2000b; 
Department for Transport (DFT) 2004; Docherty and Shaw 2003). Even after climate change began to 
rise up the policy agenda from 2000 onwards and the DfT became a signatory to a joint Public Service 
Agreement to reduce carbon emissions (HM Treasury 2004), neither the most recent Transport White 
Paper (DfT 2004) nor the ‘Energy Review’ (DTI 2006) contained explicit commitments to reduce car 
or freight journeys.  
 
The question nevertheless remains regarding the extent to which congestion reduction goals are 
compatible with emissions reduction. Whilst higher congestion runs counter to improvements in fuel 
efficiency, the goal of congestion reduction is not to deter car use but to reduce delays by optimising 
utilisation of capacity, which may simply encourage the spatial and temporal redistribution of 
problems rather than their resolution. Thus the implication is that government believes traffic can 
grow whilst still achieving emissions goals, but for this to be achieved would require reductions in 
carbon intensity which history suggests are improbable (Banister and Stead 2002, European 
Environment Agency (EEA) 2006). Although improvements in engine technology have stabilised 
emissions from passenger vehicles in the UK despite traffic increases (DfT 2006), total carbon 
emissions from this mode are still greater than they were before 1990 and emissions from other 
motorised modes are increasing in absolute terms. Furthermore, the government has admitted that 
attempts to reduce congestion are failing (DfT 2004), offering the prospect of unsustainability and 
unpopularity (Goodwin 2003).   
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National road-user charging is currently being touted by government as the best hope for congestion 
relief. If implemented – this remains a big ‘if’ (Shaw et al. 2006) – vehicles will most likely be 
charged per vehicle-mile based on the marginal congestion cost imposed, with people travelling on 
congested roads at peak times paying more than those using quieter roads at off-peak times. 
Politically, it may also be necessary for national congestion charging to begin revenue neutral with the 
option of an ‘environmental premium’ at a later date. Unfortunately, the relationship between this and 
target emissions reductions is unclear. Judging by evidence from the London Congestion Charge 
(Figure 3), it seems reasonable to suggest that road-user charging in designated urban zones is likely to 
realise emissions savings provided traffic does not divert around the zone or to alternative destinations 
and travel further (see Beeves and Carslaw 2005, Richardson et al 2004, Santos and Fraser 2006, 
Transport for London (TfL) 2006). Replicating this effect with national road-user charging, however, 
is highly dependent on the implementation path chosen. Current policy discourse and modelling 
assumes that fiscal neutrality will be derived from scaling down taxes on motoring. Recent modelling 
work conducted as part of the Eddington review of UK transport policy imposes marginal social cost 
pricing which reduced congestion by 52%, leading to increased average speeds of 14% and a reduction 
in both overall traffic and CO2 emissions of 7% by 2025 (HM Treasury 2006). This forecast, however, 
assumes a 1.3% increase in vehicle efficiency annually as a result of existing agreements between 
motor manufacturers, but sensitivity analysis reveals that halving this improvement rate leads to 
emissions 11.3% higher than the 2025 baseline. Other modelling also based on revenue neutrality 
leads to increased traffic and CO2 emissions of 7% and 5% respectively, whereas a revenue-raising 
charge is estimated to increase revenues by 57% and reduce emissions by 8.2% (Graham and Glaister 
2004). 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Given the potential redistribution of traffic to lower charged routes, the likely carbon increases from 
higher speeds and falls in motoring costs on less congested roads, revenue neutral national road-user 
charging may at best produce carbon neutrality. The London scheme nevertheless suggests that local 
congestion charging can be successful and the government is half-heartedly promoting such schemes 
through the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) (DfT 2005). But guidance on road-user charging 
schemes makes it clear that their primary target is congestion (DfT 2007a) and differential charges on 
environmental grounds are only likely to be approved where they do not reduce estimated net scheme 
benefits, thus depriving local authorities of a tool which could maximise carbon and congestion 
benefits through discounts to incentivise motorists to purchase cleaner vehicles. At a time when 
popular opinion is increasingly viewing climate change as a Trojan horse for general tax increases 
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(Anable et al. 2006), reducing local authority powers to tailor measures towards local air quality and 
climate targets risks further jeopardising the already fragile acceptability of this policy. 
 
Technology and behaviour 
Another way the government has sought to promote fuel (and, hence, emissions) efficiency is through 
restructuring of company car tax and annual car circulation tax (Vehicle Excise Duty, or VED) to 
broadly reflect vehicle CO2 emissions. These changes are making some difference at the margin, 
although the general view is that taxation band differentials are insufficiently steep to have a 
significant effect (Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT) 2007; Sustainable Development 
Commission (SDC) 2006). A further response has been to embark on a campaign of eco-driving to at 
least optimise the fuel economy of the existing vehicle fleet (DfT 2007b). In reality, however, total 
travel per capita and modal share contribute far more to overall differences in emissions per capita 
than fuel economy differentials (Brand 2006, Bristow et al. 2004; Schipper 2001), making it 
impossible to separate technological and behavioural considerations. At the very least, behaviour has 
to be realigned towards purchasing more efficient vehicles and fuels or fuel mixes. Equally, it is 
important that gains in these areas are not eroded by increasing speed and journey distances. Over the 
medium term, hybrid and battery technology may deliver modest absolute emissions reductions, but as 
with hydrogen use in transport, these technologies are only zero-emission at the tailpipe and their real 
climate change benefit is inseparable from the way the electricity or fuel is produced. Similarly, 
biofuels have substantial energy penalties due to land take, production and transportation issues 
(United Nations (UN) 2007). Also, even if technology can create near zero emission vehicles, this 
does not address the considerable energy tied up with their production and maintenance, resulting 
urban sprawl, land consumption for transport and more material consumption overall (Banister 2005).  
 
Any move towards significantly more sustainable transport thus requires a combination of low 
technology alternatives and measures to incentivise reduced mechanised travel. In the UK, the main 
mechanism for suppressing demand through fuel duty was abandoned in 2000 after nationwide fuel 
protests. Even in the absence of national supportive fiscal policy, however, bespoke ‘soft’ or ‘smart’ 
measures at the local level – such as workplace and school travel plans, individualised journey 
planning, car clubs, public transport information, marketing, teleworking and video conferencing – are 
having some success in reducing single car occupancy, particularly where multiple measures are 
introduced. By facilitating these attractive, uncontroversial and relatively cheap alternatives, such 
initiatives seek to give better information and opportunities which affect the free choices made by 
individuals. A recent UK-wide study analysing case-study evidence of these measures highlighted 
their potential traffic, emissions and cost benefits (Cairns et al. 2004). It concluded that voluntary 
changes in car use arising from soft measures could reduce traffic in the UK by around 11% nationally 
(high intensity scenario) and 3% in the low intensity scenario. Projections for local peak period traffic 
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reduction ranged between 5% and 21% in urban areas. This study has been corroborated by results 
from three ‘demonstration towns’ which were allocated £10 million in 2004 to become showcases of 
smart measures packages. In those participating in experiments of individualised marketing 
campaigns, car trips reduced by between 11% and 13%, whilst public transport trips increased 4-22%, 
walking 17-29% and cycling 25-79% (Merron 2007). Even using conservative estimates of traffic 
savings, UK government analysis of savings from smart measures highlights cost effectiveness but 
also estimates national carbon savings of 0.6MtC by 2010, 9% over current planned savings of 
6.67MtC from transport policies in the UK Climate Change Programme (Figure 2) (DEFRA 2007b; 
Anable 2005a).  
 
Given their potential for early implementation and focus on travel volume, smart measures strike an 
important balance between technological and behavioural solutions. As yet, however, they do not 
enjoy ‘mainstream’ policy status, not least because significant behaviour shifts are seen as difficult to 
attain. This seems curious as evidence indicates a willingness amongst the general population to 
become less car dependent: a 15-20% reduction in individual car journeys could, it seems, be secured 
relatively easily and quickly in a supportive policy environment (Anable 2005b, Cairns et al. 2002; 
2004; Dudleston et al. 2005; RAC Foundation 1995; Rye 2002). In the light of this evidence, the 
current lack of policy emphasis on behavioural change appears to be a clear missed opportunity. 
 
With regard to air travel, there are three main ways to reduce emissions without reducing flight 
volumes: improved air traffic management; improved operational efficiency (loading factors, weight 
reduction, aircraft speed, lower use of auxiliary power, reducing taxiing); and technological 
improvements (e.g. new airframe and engine designs and alternative fuels). The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (1999) estimates that traffic management could potentially achieve a 
global saving of 6-12% in fuel consumption by 2050, while operational improvements could save a 
further 2-6%; practical alternatives to kerosene-based fuels were, however, unlikely to emerge in the 
coming decades. With respect to technological change, Cairns and Newson (2006: 19) argue that: 
 
while there are considerable opportunities for incremental improvements in the 
environmental performance of individual aircraft, these will not offset the effects of the 
growth in aviation. Moreover, whilst a non-incremental change could result from radically 
new airframe designs, these were not expected to affect the industry for decades and even 
then, would only apply to large long-haul aircraft. 
 
The need to effect behaviour change by reducing flights – for example by further rises in the recently-
doubled Air Passenger Duty (APD) or the promotion of ‘smart’ measures such as videoconferencing – 
is clearly evident in this context. 
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Short term and long term 
Previous sections have already hinted at tensions within UK transport policy between short-term 
congestion mitigation measures and reliance on long-term technical solutions for carbon abatement. 
Worryingly, this reliance is not being matched by the concurrent development of route-maps to enact 
technical solutions within target periods. As Kohler (2006) observes, although long-term thinking is 
commonplace in transport analysis, there is little attempt to change infrastructure investment, vehicles 
and behaviour in any other direction than towards activity using the latest technologies. This is 
especially important given the sector’s 99% dependence on oil, the sunk capital investment in these 
fuels and existing vehicle fleets, and the lead times to change policies and affect outcomes. Even 
current debates on ‘Peak Oil’ and energy security have not apparently concentrated thinking towards 
more radical action. If the government’s projections of conventional reserves extending to 2030 are 
correct, this is a short time to address these structural issues (EAC 2006). If ready for mass production 
today, at least 20 years would be needed before a significant proportion of the vehicle fleet could run 
on non-carbon fuels or electricity generated from renewable resources (Banister 2005). The essential 
challenge, therefore, is planning that allows a focus on securing quick results as well as pursuing 
longer-term goals. 
 
Another issue is the apparent disproportionate focus on end-point emissions targets compared with the 
rate of attainment. Although this applies to all sectors with the possible exception of energy-intensive 
manufacturing, there seems general agreement that transport is particularly difficult and costly sector 
to decarbonise. Given the residence times of many greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the rate of 
progress towards the target for 2050 may be crucial (Buchan, 2007). Figure 4 depicts three indicative 
scenarios, each delivering an end date target of a 60% reduction in carbon emissions along different 
reduction trajectories. The ‘slow start’ is based on actual UK projections for transport. The ‘straight 
reduction’ assumes an equal annual rate of carbon reduction to 2050. The ‘rapid start’ involves a 
radical policy shift combining demand management with technological improvement. For the slow 
start to achieve the same overall emissions as the rapid start or the linear trajectory would require 
exceptionally high future annual reduction rates. From this, Buchan (2007) argues that delay is the 
equivalent of not achieving the target. As well as illustrating the critical nature of making early 
progress, this analysis points to the validity of interim targets to promote the merit of short-term as 
well as longer-term gains and to allow early policy adjustment. Moreover, given that the 60% target 
may be inadequate to prevent serious climate disruptions, there is clear merit, from a risk management 
perspective, in achieving this target significantly sooner than planned (IPCC 2007; Hickman and 
Banister 2006).   
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
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Scale in transport policy delivery 
Our discussion so far has indicated that transport and climate policy are misaligned in terms of 
addressing the sector’s carbon emissions. A greater and more explicit commitment to tackling CO2 
emissions is obviously necessary despite the political difficulties which apparently brought about 
retreat from the principles advocated in A New Deal for Transport (Docherty and Shaw 2003). 
Alongside strategic realignment, however, ‘on-the-ground’ policy delivery also warrants serious 
reappraisal. More support for ‘smart’ measures is clearly a priority. Another is tackling what might be 
described as the ideological hangover of deregulation and privatisation in the public transport sector – 
inherited from the Conservative administrations of the 1980s and 1990s but left largely unchanged by 
Labour – and the ability of the restructured industries to deliver services capable of accommodating 
significant modal shift (Foster 1994, Preston 2003, Wolmar, 2005). Railway passenger numbers are 
around 40% higher than in the final years of the nationally-owned British Rail (BR), although how far 
this reflects private sector dynamism is contested. Certainly the network is more expensive to run 
(around £5 billion in annual subsidy compared to less than half that under BR) and is operating at 
capacity on many main routes with major schemes to increase capacity some years away. Bus 
patronage has fallen in most English regions (Table 2) and both bus and rail fares have increased in 
absolute terms while the cost of motoring has fallen relative to GDP (DfT 2006). Only London and 
Northern Ireland escaped complete bus deregulation, and the reintroduction of measures to improve 
coordination of services and fare-setting in the regions (Davison and Knowles 2006, Preston 2003) 
and a re-evaluation of the rail industry’s role and structure (Shaw et al. 2003) are probably necessary 
to address the peripherality of public transport on a national scale.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Indeed, the notion of scale, as in many other environmental governance debates (Bulkeley 2005, 
Hulme and Turnpenny 2004, Liverman 1999, 2004, McCarthy 2005, Neumayer 2004), is vital to 
considerations of how to reduce transport emissions.
1
 Admittedly, rigid conceptualisations of discrete 
and hierarchical ‘scalar’ organisation and the fixity of the state have been increasingly questioned in 
recent geographical writings on governance, globalisation and glocalisation (Collinge 2006, Herod 
2003, Hoefle 2006, Jonas 2006, Marston et al. 2005, Shepherd and McMaster 2004). Nonetheless, it is 
important to recognise that certain elements of a strategy to address the climate impacts of transport 
are (and need to be) developed and implemented at particular scales. Climate change transcends 
national boundaries – although its effects are unevenly distributed around the globe – making 
supranational agreements on high-level concerns undoubtedly necessary. The Kyoto Protocol is the 
most obvious, although the EU-negotiated voluntary agreements with car manufacturers constitute a 
                                                 
1
 The Eddington Report (HM Treasury 2006) on the role played by transport in the UK’s economic performance 
contained quite specific geographical references, although really not in the sense we convey in this paper.  
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good transport-specific example. At the other end of the spectrum, ‘smart’ measures show how 
generally agreed principles can be operationalised at the local/regional scale. Such approaches are 
hardly novel, of course, as LA21 exemplifies, but are frequently limited in their success at transposing 
high-level agreements into on-the-ground action. 
 
In this arena it is important to look beyond scalar extremes in order to free ‘narratives from the 
singular and limiting preoccupations of locality on the one hand, and of globality on the other’ (Jonas, 
2006, 400). Equally important is negotiating and promoting linkages between scales to allow policy 
and other networks to facilitate genuine transfers of knowledge, expertise and power: Allen (2003) 
points out the importance of associational forms of ‘power to’ achieve certain goals and aspirations 
which develop as people or groups work together. To borrow – in a somewhat different context – from 
Routledge (2003), what is needed is ‘convergence space’, both literally (as we argue below) and 
metaphorically. Convergence space is simultaneously diverse, uneven, multi-scalar and contested but 
can harness associational power because it promotes a ‘heterogeneous affinity… between various 
social transformations’ (Routledge 2003, 345). In this discussion, this implies working towards linking 
different scales of science (as the provenance of knowledge about climate change), policy (as the fora 
where decisions on action are made), activism (as a means of mobilisation for and against these 
decisions) and individual travel behaviour to achieve meaningful reductions in transport emissions 
(Goodwin and Barr 2007). Re-emphasising the regional scale in UK transport governance might 
provide such a way forward. 
 
Jonas (2006, 402) notes that the ‘region’ (in all its guises) represents an ‘inbetweenness’ of “processes, 
sites, agencies, flows, etc., many of which work at scales which are neither simply ‘local’ nor 
‘global’.” Traditionally, regions have been viewed as bounded territorial units (the ‘uniform’ and 
‘functional’ regions referred to by Taaffe and Gauthier (1973)) but, recently, such spatial 
simplification has been questioned as authors have emphasised connections with other spaces and 
flows in a network society (Castells 1996, Sheller and Urry 2006). In transport terms we can think of 
the ‘city-region’, the principal concept on which we shall focus, geographically defined as a travel-to-
work area but containing wider connections in its environmental, economic and social functions. 
Existing transport patterns display a clear local/regional dimension, especially in their amenability to 
modal shift: most journeys are short (average trip length is 6.9 miles and 69% of business trips are 
under 15 miles (DfT 2006)); Banister and Gallant (1998: 340-341) found ‘a great deal of scope’ for 
increasing the number of people who walk to work and ‘scope to increase substantially the number of 
people cycling’ to work in England and Wales; and 37% of people questioned agreed that many short 
car journeys they now make could just as easily be made by walking or cycling (DfT 2007c). 
Developing and implementing transport policy at the scale of the city-region thus offers the 
opportunity to develop flexible, spatially sensitive approaches (e.g. ‘smart’ measures), mobilise 
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community action and promote meaningful engagement by citizens and activist groups in decisions 
affecting transport patterns and behaviour in their regions (McEvoy et al. 1998, Soussan 2004). 
Crucially, in harnessing this ‘power to’ (Allen 2003) seek change, the city-region offers economies of 
scale in transport provision and, provided there is sufficient ‘strategic capacity’ (an issue to which we 
return), the opportunity to develop integrated transport strategies across an area large enough that most 
journeys begin and end within the same administrative authority. 
 
Devolution and city regions 
Throughout much of the last two decades, the UK’s institutional landscape has been singularly 
incompatible with effective regional transport governance. Already in control of a highly centralised 
state (Morgan 2001), the Conservative administrations of Margaret Thatcher and John Major 
abolished the metropolitan councils in the 1980s and 1990s in favour of smaller sub-metropolitan 
authorities (Begg and Docherty 2003). The powers of the resultantly weakened Passenger Transport 
Authorities (PTAs) were further undermined through deregulation initiatives which removed the 
ability to plan integrated timetables and determine fares (Figure 5). Recent developments have, 
however, provided scope for more meaningful decentralisation. The Labour government’s decision to 
devolve selective powers to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies 
appears to have kick-started a return to regional transport policy – albeit at this stage in rather weak 
functional terms and only partially based on city-regions – with the formation of statutory Regional 
Transport Partnerships in Scotland and voluntary Regional Transport Consortia in Wales (Cole 2005, 
Docherty et al. 2007, MacKinnon et al. forthcoming). In both Scotland and Wales, the devolved 
governments have also stopped short of introducing London-style bus regulation (Hendy 2005). 
 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
In the absence of devolved government in most of England, London – which was granted partial 
devolution in the form of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 2000 – provides the clearest 
example of city-regional transport governance. The GLA has substantial transport powers over a range 
of modes including strategic roads, the Underground, London Buses, taxis, river boat services and 
light rail, while some heavy rail commuter services passed to the GLA’s control in November 2007. 
The GLA can also raise bond finance to support its £10 billion capital investment plan. This level of 
authority and financial position, combined with strong political leadership from Mayor Ken 
Livingstone, has created favourable conditions for the pursuit of a speedily introduced and apparently 
successful ‘sustainable’ transport strategy (MacKinnon et al. forthcoming). At the time, national 
ministers regarded this strategy – which centres on the Congestion Charge and significant public 
transport improvements – as politically dangerous and publicly distanced themselves from its more 
controversial elements, although Livingstone was easily re-elected to office. One reason why 
 12 
Livingstone’s electoral chances were not harmed by the congestion charge is geographical: few 
Londoners have been negatively affected by the charge because most do not drive into central London, 
whereas many people from across the city have benefited from improved public transport. This has 
created, literally, a ‘space of convergence’ in which there is agreement to promote radical change in 
transport policy across a wide range of constituencies, and is in some contrast to a national scheme 
where most people, especially in non-metropolitan areas, think they will be adversely affected because 
public transport alternatives are less well developed. Indeed, over 1.7 million people recently signed a 
petition on the Prime Minister’s website against national road-user charging, voicing concern over its 
financial implications and the potential employment of ‘big brother’ satellite tracking devices (BBC 
2007).  
 
London is clearly atypical and whether city-scale congestion charging schemes would be capable of 
relatively trouble-free introduction elsewhere in the country remains uncertain. Edinburgh’s failed 
attempt to introduce a scheme in 2005 provides a salutary lesson (Gaunt et al. 2007), although the 
council made clear errors in its approach and the city is considerably smaller than the major English 
city-regions (although it does have higher than average bus use). London does demonstrate, however, 
that addressing transport’s climate impacts requires more than top down framework-setting, new 
vehicle technologies, and poorly supported, ill-equipped and fragmented local authorities unable to 
promote effective modal shift strategies across transport-intensive city regions. Indeed, other English 
local authorities are unable to determine transport outcomes in critical policy areas largely because, 
having seen their power-base diminish following successive local-government reforms, they are 
generally dependent on central government for both sanction and funding of plans. Local Transport 
Plans or TIF bids containing elements central government does not like (e.g. light rail proposals 
(Knowles 2007)) are arguably disadvantaged even if they are robust strategies in climate-change 
terms. As yet local authorities have been unable to take advantage of bond financing and some county 
councils, such as Essex, are investigating ways of creating new revenue streams through private sector 
partnerships (Transport Times 2007a). The fragmented nature of local government in cities is also a 
hindrance: for example, the 10 local authorities putting together a joint TIF bid for the Manchester 
city-region have encountered inter-authority squabbling as two councils withdrew their support for the 
road-user charging element prior to local elections in May 2007 and majority support among members 
of the Greater Manchester PTA still not assured (Transport Times 2007b).  
 
In short, London-style arrangements of devolved political authority, appropriate funding and strong 
political leadership – i.e. ‘strategic capacity’ (Marsden and May 2006, MacKinnon et al., in press) – 
are not in place in other travel-to-work areas in the country. Although strong political leadership can 
never be legislated for, Marsden and May (2006: 771) argue that London provides ‘a compelling 
argument for … an overarching tier of government to organise travel over a spatial scale compatible 
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with that of major commuter patterns.’ Interestingly, the city-region agenda is gaining support in 
influential transport policy circles (Centre for Cities 2007, Commission for Integrated Transport 
2007b, Improvement and Development Agency 2007) and there are signs that some form of regional 
transport governance arrangements might be introduced in and around the major English conurbations 
within the medium term. Marsden and May note that the prize of securing London-style institutional 
arrangements for transport in the city-regions ‘alone may justify the disruption from a further set of 
institutional changes’ (p 787).  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed an overview and critique of how the formulation and delivery of 
transport policy fit alongside the exposition of climate policy objectives within the UK, reflecting the 
sector’s significant and growing contribution to greenhouse-gas emissions. Our analysis has revealed 
serious imbalances between the two in terms of priorities and means of delivery, including a 
disproportionate dependence on technological advancement compared with securing behavioural 
changes to reduce transport-related emissions. From this we contend that whilst the contributions of 
economists, engineers and psychologists are all essential in devising adequate pricing mechanisms, 
technological developments and behavioural modifications to reduce transport’s climate impacts, these 
need to be complemented by a greater appreciation of geographical – and especially scale – factors 
involved in the design and delivery of transport policy. Drawing upon notions of governance scales 
and convergence space, we have argued that the city-region provides a promising arena for addressing 
transport’s climate impacts. City-regions are spaces in which large numbers of journeys take place and 
in which these can be effectively managed, and in which devolved government and communities can 
converge to transpose international agreements and national aspirations (e.g. Kyoto and VAs) into 
strategic action plans (including charging schemes and ‘smart measures’) capable of delivering 
geographically bespoke but nevertheless meaningful reductions in CO2 emissions. 
 
The effective pursuit of the city-region agenda will, however, require the creation of more robust 
governance arrangements involving the genuine devolution of power. The London example 
demonstrates clearly how institutional change combined with strong leadership has allowed the 
development of crucial strategic capacity to deliver genuine on-the-ground reforms that can evade 
political acceptability barriers that tend to afflict initiatives like national road-user charging. This 
contrasts with transport governance in other conurbations but also with experience in other sectors 
where an apparently regionalising policy agenda has been followed. Writing about English regional 
development agencies, Roberts and Benneworth (2001, 142) note that although these bodies were 
supposed to ‘inject a higher level of territorial specificity into the design and content of economic 
development policies’, they were created ‘without increasing the degree of political devolution’ and as 
such can be criticised as being agents of the central state. To judge by the analysis in this paper, 
 14 
simply repeating such an exercise in the transport sector is unlikely to be of much benefit in tackling 
climate change.  
 15 
Acknowledgements 
Dr Anable is funded by the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), Grant # NE/C513169/1. We 
would also like to thank Clive Charlton, Ian Bailey and two referees for their extremely valuable 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Jamie Quinn and Brian Rogers of the Cartographical 
Resources Unit at the University of Plymouth for drawing the artwork. 
 16 
References 
Allen J 2003 Lost geographies of power Blackwell, Oxford 
 
Anable J 2005a Soft measures - soft option or smarter choice for early energy savings in the transport 
sector? Paper presented to European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ECEEE) 2005 
Summer Study, Mandelieu, France, 30/5/05-4/6/05 
 
Anable J 2005b Complacent car addicts or aspiring environmentalists? Identifying travel behaviour 
segments using attitude theory Transport Policy 12 65-78 
 
Anable J and Boardman B 2005 Transport and CO2 UKERC Working Paper 
 
Anable J, Lane B and Kelay T 2006 An evidence base review of attitudes to climate change and 
transport Report for the UK Department for Transport, London 
 
BBC 2007 Q&A: road pricing news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6382211.stm Accessed 20 March 2007 
 
Bailey I and Rupp S 2005 Geography and climate policy: a comparative assessment of ‘new’ 
environmental policy instruments in the UK and Germany Geoforum 36 387–401 
 
Banister C and Gallent N 1998 Trends in commuting in England and Wales – becoming less 
sustainable? Area 30 331-342 
 
Banister D 2005 Unsustainable transport Spon, London 
 
Banister D and Stead D 2002 Reducing transport intensity European Journal of Transport 
Infrastructure Research 2 161-178 
 
Beevers S and Carslaw D 2005 The impact of congestion charging on vehicle emissions in London.  
Atmospheric Environment 39 1-5 
 
Begg D and Gray D 2004 Transport policy and vehicle emissions objectives in the UK: is the 
marriage between transport and environmental policy over? Environmental Science and Policy 7 155-
163 
 
Brand C 2006 Personal transport and climate change: Exploring climate change emissions from 
personal travel activity of individuals and households Unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford 
 
Bristow A Pridmore A May D and Tight M 2004 Low carbon transport futures: how acceptable are 
they? Paper presented at World Conference on Transport Research 4-6 July 2004, Istanbul 
 
Buchan K 2007 Reducing greenhouse emissions from transport - UK national project Phase One: 
Perspectives. Targets: how far and how fast? 2
nd
 Draft 
www.transportclimate.org/documents/mtrulocarb_targets3.pdf Accessed 15 March 2007 
 
Bulkeley H 2005 Reconfiguring environmental governance: towards a politics of scales and networks. 
Political Geography 24 875-902 
 
Cairns S and Newson C with Boardman B and Anable J 2006 Predict and decide: aviation, 
climate change and UK Policy, Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University 
 
Cairns S Atkins S and Goodwin P 2002 Disappearing traffic, the story so far Municipal Engineer 
151 13-22 
 
 17 
Cairns S, Sloman L, Newson C, Anable J, Kirkbride A and Goodwin P 2004 Smarter choices – 
changing the way we travel.  Final report of the research project – the influence of soft factor 
interventions on travel demand Department for Transport, London 
 
Castells M 1996 The information age: economy, society and culture vol 1 The rise of the network 
society Blackwell, Cambridge MA. 
 
Centre for Cities 2007 Connecting cities Institute of Public and Policy Research, London 
 
Chapman L 2007 Transport and climate change: a review Journal of Transport Geography In press 
 
Cole S 2005 Devolved government and transport – relationships, process and policy Public Money & 
Management 25 179-185 
 
Collinge C 2006 Flat ontology and the deconstruction of scale: a response to Marston, Jones and 
Woodward Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31 244-251 
 
Commission for Integrated Transport 2007a Transport and climate change CfIT, London 
 
Commission for Integrated Transport 2007b Moving forward: better transport for city regions. 
CfIT, London 
 
Davison L and Knowles R 2006 Bus quality partnerships, modal shift and traffic decongestion 
Journal of Transport Geography 14 177-194 
 
DEFRA 2004 Review of the climate change programme: consultation paper December 2004 DEFRA, 
London 
 
DEFRA 2006a Climate change: the UK programme 2006 March CM6764, The Stationery Office, 
London 
 
DEFRA 2007a e-digest. Available at: 
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/globatmos/download/xls/gatb05.xls Accessed 10 March 
2007 
 
DEFRA2007b Synthesis of climate change policy appraisals January 2007 
 
Department for Transport 2004 The future of transport White Paper CM6243. DfT London 
 
Department for Transport 2005 The transport innovation fund 
www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/regional/tif/thetransportinnovationfund Accessed 20 March 2007 
 
Department for Transport 2006 Transport statistics Great Britain 2006, 32nd edition October 2005 
DfT, London 
 
Department for Transport 2007a Business case guidance for the road pricing element of the TIF 
package DfT, London 
 
Department for Transport 2007b With help from you we can reduce CO2 
www.dft.gov.uk/ActOnCO2/ Accessed 10 March 2007 
 
Department for Transport 2007c Transport trends: current edition 
www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/datatablespublications/trends/current/ Accessed 20 March 2007 
 
 18 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 1998 A new deal for transport: better 
for everyone Cmnd 3950 The Stationery Office, London 
 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 2000a Climate change draft UK 
programme November 2001 DETR, London 
 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 2000b Transport 2010: the 10-year 
plan DETR, London 
 
Department of Trade and Industry 2006 The energy challenge DTI, London 
 
Department of Trade and Industry 2007a Meeting the energy challenge. A white paper on energy 
DTI, London 
 
Department of Trade and Industry 2007b Synthesis of the analysis of the energy white paper URN 
07/971 DTI, London 
 
Department of Trade and Industry 2007c Updated energy and carbon emissions projections. The 
energy white paper DTI, London 
 
Docherty I 1999 Making tracks: the politics of local rail transport Ashgate, Aldershot 
 
Docherty I and Begg D 2003 Restructuring transport planning in Scotland Scottish Affairs 45 128-56 
 
Docherty I and Shaw J 2003 A new deal for transport? The UK’s struggle with the sustainable 
transport agenda Blackwell, Oxford 
 
Docherty I, Shaw J and Gray D 2007 Transport strategy in Scotland since devolution Public Money 
and Management 27 141-48 
 
Dudleston A, Hewitt E, Stradling S and Anable J 2005 Public perceptions of travel awareness - 
Phase 3 Final report Scottish Executive Central Research Unit  
 
Environmental Audit Committee 2006 Reducing carbon emissions from transport: Ninth report of 
session 2005–06 vols I and II House of Commons, London 
 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport 2007 Cutting transport CO2 emissions – what 
progress? OECD Paris 
 
European Environment Agency 2006 Transport and the environment: Facing a dilemma: TERM 
2005 indicators tracking transport and environment in the European Union EEA Report 3/2006 
 
Foster C 1994 The economics of rail privatisation Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, 
London 
 
Gaunt M Rye T and Allen S 2007 Public acceptability of road user charging: the case of Edinburgh 
and the 2005 referendum Transport Reviews 27 85-102 
 
Goodwin M and Barr S 2007 The politics of scale in climate change research: enquiry, policy and 
activism. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Association of American Geographers, San 
Francisco, California, April 2007 
 
 19 
Goodwin P 2003 Towards a genuinely sustainable transport agenda in Docherty I and Shaw J 2003 
A new deal for transport? The UK’s struggle with the sustainable transport agenda Blackwell, Oxford 
229-244 
 
Goodwin P Hallett S Kenny P and Stokes G 1991 Transport: the new realism Transport Studies 
Unit, University of Oxford 
 
Graham D and Glaister S 2004 Road traffic demand elasticity estimates: a review Transport Reviews 
24 261-74 
 
Hendy P 2005 New development: exemplary provision of bus services—Is London a model for other 
conurbations? Public Money and Management 25 195–200 
 
Herod A 2003 Scale: the local and the global in Holloway S, Rice S and Valentine G eds Key 
concepts in geography Sage, London 213-235 
 
Hickman R and Banister D 2006 Looking over the horizon Report to DfT 
 
HM Government 2007 Draft climate change bill March 2007 The Stationery Office, London 
 
HM Treasury 2004 2004 Spending review: Public Service Agreements 2005-2008 HM Treasury, 
London 
 
HM Treasury 2006 Eddington review main report November 2006 HM Treasury and DfT, London 
 
Hoefle S 2006 Eliminating scale and killing the goose that laid the golden egg? Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 31 238-243. 
 
Hulme M and Turnpenny J 2004 Understanding and managing climate change: The UK experience. 
Geographical Journal 170 105-15 
 
Improvement and Development Agency 2007 City regions  
www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=4730940 Accessed 20 July 2007 
 
International of Energy Agency 2005 CO2 emissions from fuel combustion IEA, London 
 
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change 1999 Aviation and the global atmosphere IPCC, 
Geneva 
 
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change 2007 Climate change 2007: the physical science 
basis: summary for policy makers IPCC, Geneva 
 
Jonas A 2006 Pro scale: further reflections on the ‘scale debate’ in human geography Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 31 399-406 
 
Knowles R 2007 What future for light rail in the UK after ten year plan transport plan targets are 
scrapped? Transport Policy in press 
 
Kohler J 2006 Transport and the environment: policy and economic consideration foresight 
intelligent infrastructure systems project available at:  
 
Liverman D 1999 Geography and the global environment Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 89 107-20 
 
 20 
Liverman D 2004 Who governs at what scale and at what price? Geography, environmental 
governance and the commodification of nature Annals of the Association of American Geographers 94 
734-38 
 
MacKinnon D, Shaw J and Docherty I forthcoming Diverging mobilities? Devolution, transport and 
policy innovation Elsevier Science, Oxford, in press 
 
Marsden G and May A 2006 Do institutional arrangements make a difference to transport policy and 
implementation? Lessons for Britain Environment and Planning C 24 771-98 
 
Marston S Jones J and Woodward K 2005 Human geography without scale Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 30 416-32 
 
McCarthy J 2005 Scale, sovereignty, and strategy in environmental governance Antipode 37 731-53 
 
McEvoy D, Gibbs D and Longhurst J 1998 Urban sustainability: problems facing the 'local' 
approach to carbon-reduction strategies Environment and Planning C 16 423-32  
 
Merron, G 2007 Speech on sustainable travel towns 23
rd
 May 2007 
www.dft.gov.uk/press/speechesstatements/speeches/spcgmsustraveltowns Accessed 1 July 2007 
 
Morgan K 2001 Regional and national identities in the United Kingdom in Salmon T and Keating 
M eds The dynamics of decentralisation: Canadian federalism and British devolution McGill-Queens 
University Press, Montreal and Kingston 7-20 
 
Neumayer E 2004 National carbon dioxide emissions: geography matters Area 36 33-40 
  
RAC Foundation 1995 Car dependence. RAC Foundation for motoring and the environment, London 
 
Richardson T, Livingstone K, Banister D, Goodwin P, Urry J and Siemiatycki M 2004 Interface 
Planning Theory & Practice 5 487-514 
 
Roberts P and Benneworth P 2001 Pathways to the Future? An initial assessment of RDA strategies 
and their contribution to integrated regional development Local Economy 16 142-159. 
 
Routledge P 2003 Convergence space: process geographies of grassroots globalization networks 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 28 333-49 
 
Rye T 2002 Travel plans: do they work? Transport Policy 9 287-298 
 
Santos G and Fraser G 2006 Road pricing: lessons from London Economic Policy 21 264-310 
 
Schipper L 2001 The road from Kyoto: how much from transportation? Transport policies in six IEA 
countries paper presented at the 2001 ECEEE summer study 
 
Shaw J, Hunter C and Gray D 2006 Disintegrated transport policy: the multi modal study process in 
England Environment and Planning C 24 575-596 
 
Shaw J, Walton W and Farrington J 2003 Assessing the potential for a ‘railway renaissance’ in 
Great Britain Geoforum 34 141-56 
 
Sheller M and Urry J 2006 The new mobilities paradigm Environment and Planning A 38 207-26 
 
Shepherd E and McMaster R 2004 Scale and geographic inquiry: nature, society and method 
Blackwell, Oxford 
 21 
 
Soussan J 2004 Linking the local to the global: can sustainable development work in practice in 
Purvis M and Grainger A eds Exploring sustainable development: geographical perspectives 
Earthscan, London 85-98 
 
Sustainable Development Commission 2006 Changes in VED – modelling 
 
Taaffe E and Gauthier H 1973 The geography of transportation Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ 
 
Transport for London 2006 Central London congestion charging: impacts monitoring fourth annual 
report June 2006 TfL, London 
 
Transport Times 2007a Bridging the funding gap 16 February 35 16 
 
Transport Times 2007b Manchester reveals £5 road user charge 25 Ma, 4, 1 
 
United Nations 2007 Sustainable bioenergy: a framework for decision makers UN Energy. April 
2007 
 
Wolmar C 2005 On the wrong line: how ideology and incompetence wrecked Britain’s railways 
Aurum Press, London 
 
 
 
 
 22 
Table 1 UK emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2 expressed as Carbon) by transport mode, UK 1990-
2005, Million Tonnes Carbon (MtC). Source: Defra 2007a; figures by ‘source’. 
 
 
  1990 2005 1990-2005 
change 
Share of total 
transport 
sector 
2005 
Share of 
total CO2 
2005 
  (MtC) (MtC) % % % 
Passenger cars 19.2 19.1 -0.5  41.3  11.7  
Heavy Good Vehicles (HGVs) 6 7.8 30.0  16.9  4.8  
Light duty vehicles (LGVs) 3.1 4.6 48.4  10.0  2.8  
Buses 1.3 1 -23.1  2.2  0.6  
Motorcycles 0.1 0.1 0.0  0.2  0.1  
Road transport only 29.8 32.7 9.7  70.8  20.1  
Railways 0.4 0.6 50.0  1.3  0.4  
Civil aircraft 0.3 0.6 100.0  1.3  0.4  
National maritime 1.1 1.1 0.0  2.4  0.7  
Other 0.2 0.2 0.0  0.4  0.1  
Domestic transport sector 31.7 35.1 10.7  76.0  21.6  
Domestic UK CO2  160.7 151.7 -5.6    93.2  
      
International aviation 4.3 9.5 120.9  20.6  5.8  
International maritime 1.8 1.6 -11.1  3.5  1.0  
Total transport sector (incl. 
international) 37.8 46.2 22.2  100.0  28.4  
Total CO2 (incl. international) 166.8 162.8 -2.4  - 100.0  
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Table 2. Changes in Local Bus Passenger Journeys by Area 1985 / 86 – 2004 / 05 (million bus passenger 
kilometres). Source: DfT, 2006. 
 
Area   a) 1985/86 b) 2000/01 c) 2004/05 % change % change 
           a) to c)      b) to c) 
London     1152  1347  1782  +54.7  +32.3 
England metropolitan
1     
2068  1166  1083  -47.6    -7.1 
England shire
2
    1588  1247  1167  -26.5    -6.4 
England total  4807  3761  4032  -16.1              +7.2 
Scotland  671    443    465  -34.0   +5.0 
Wales   163    116    113  -30.7    -2.6 
Great Britain  5641  4312  4609  -18.3   +6.9 
 
1 
Provincial conurbations of Greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West 
Midlands and West Yorkshire, centred respectively around the cities of Manchester, Liverpool, 
Sheffield, Newcastle, Birmingham and Leeds. 
2 
Non-metropolitan counties ranging from large cities to rural areas. 
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Figure 1 Estimated carbon savings in 2010 from transport measures included in the UK CCP. Source: 
DTI 2007a 2007b. Notes: Voluntary Agreements Package – voluntary agreements have existed since 
1997 between the EC and the European, Japanese and Korean automobile producers to reduce average 
sales-weighted new car fuel emissions. The initial target for emissions from the tailpipe was 
140g/CO2/km by 2008/9. The UK is expected to reach 162g/km by 2008. Savings include those from 
vehicle excise duty and company car tax designed to accelerate the purchase of low carbon vehicles; 
Fuel Duty Escalator – annual increase in duty rates introduced in 1993 at a rate of 3% above inflation, 
increased to 5% in 1995, and again to 6% in 1997 and removed in 2000; Renewable Transport Fuels 
Obligation – introduced in 2008-09, with the obligation level set at 2.5% volume of fuel sold, rising to 
3.75% in 2009-10 and again to 5% in 2010-11. This figure is ‘gross’ and does not take into account 
the carbon emitted during the production of biofuels; Other policies – include some urban congestion 
charging schemes, sustainable distribution (including in Scotland) smarter measures, rail investment 
and ‘other’ policies. Figures are updated from the original CCP by DTI 2007a and b. 
 
Figure 2 UK historic and projected sector end user CO2 emissions to 2020. Source: DTI 2007c. Note: 
These projections exclude the effect of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
 
Figure 3 London congestion charging zone. After TfL 2006. 
 
Figure 4 Excess emissions from transport over 60% target. Reproduced with kind permission from K 
Buchan. 
 
Figure 5 Passenger Transport Authority areas in Great Britain. Note: Strathclyde PTA’s 
boundaries are shown from 1996, when it was expanded in size, to 2005 when it was 
superseded by Strathclyde Partnership for Transport. After Docherty 1999. 
 
 
